CVE-2026-84170
📛 CVE Title
Apache Wicket: Configured upload limits are not enforced by the standalone file upload resource
Description
Allocation of resources without limits or throttling in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.upload.resource.AbstractFileUploadResource is the server side of the form-less upload offered by FileUploadToResourceField, which posts the selected files to a separately mounted resource rather than through a Form. The resource is an application-wide singleton with no component to consult, so newResourceResponse() takes the three limits that bound the upload - the total request size, the maximum size of a single part and the maximum number of parts - from the request parameters maxSize, fileMaxSize and fileCountMax, and hands them to the multipart parser as they arrive. Nothing binds those numbers to the field that is supposed to be uploading. A request naming a very large maxSize is therefore parsed with no effective ceiling on the total size, and omitting fileMaxSize and fileCountMax leaves the per-part and part-count limits unset as well. The values the application configured through FileUploadToResourceField#setMaxSize(), #setFileMaxSize() and #setFileCountMax() are consulted only when the client omits the corresponding parameter, so against a client that supplies one they have no effect at all. Parts above the parser's in-memory threshold are spooled to the container's temporary directory, and the file parts are then copied into the folder the application's IUploadsFileManager owns, under a sub-folder the request names, where they remain. A part that is not a file is read into the heap in full while the request is parsed. One request, repeatable, can therefore consume as much disk or as much heap as the client chooses to send. The resource carries no authorization annotation and the default authorization strategy permits every resource request, so unless the application authorizes the resource itself the request needs no authentication, no session, no prior page view and no user interaction. An application is affected where it uses FileUploadToResourceField, or mounts FileUploadResourceReference itself. This is not the ordinary upload path: the resource is a singleton that has to be created and mounted deliberately. An application that configures no upload limit at all loses nothing, because Wicket applies no total-size limit of its own by default; what the defect removes is a limit the application set. Uploads through Form with FileUploadField, and through AjaxFileDropBehavior, are not affected, because both read their limits from the component rather than from the request. The upload resource does not exist in the 8.x line. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 9.14.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.9.1. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.
Overview
- State
- PUBLISHED
- Assigner (CNA)
- apache
- CVSS severity
- HIGH
- CVSS score
- 8.3 / 10
- CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N- Effective score
- 8.3 / 10 HIGH source: CNA overview
- CWE(s)
-
CWE-770 - Reserved
- 2026-09-01
- Published
- 2026-11-01 22:22 UTC
- Last updated
- 2026-11-01 22:22 UTC
- Source
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/84xxx/CVE-2026-84170.json
- Linked Threat
- CVE-2026-84170 — Apache Wicket: Configured upload limits are not enforced by the standalone file upload resource
NVD triage scoring NVD CVE 2.0
Layer NVD adds on top of the CNA's CVE record — published / last-modified timestamps, exploitability / impact subscores, and the FIRST.org EPSS probability that this CVE will be exploited in the wild in the next 30 days.
- NVD published
- 2026-11-01 23:17:29 UTC
- NVD last modified
- 2026-11-01 23:17:29 UTC
NVD / KEV / EPSS data refreshed 2026-11-02 13:53 UTC. Re-run the 🛰 Backfill from NVD button above to refresh.
European Union Vulnerability Database ENISA EUVD
ENISA's official EU repository for curated vulnerability intelligence. Carries a separate identifier (EUVD-YYYY-NNNN) and frequently exposes an earlier-published description + CVSS than NVD does.
- EUVD ID
-
EUVD-2026-114898 - Assigner
- apache
- Published
- Nov 1, 2026, 10:22:48 PM
- Updated
- Nov 1, 2026, 10:22:48 PM
- EUVD base score (CVSS 4.0)
-
8.3 / 10
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - EUVD-reported EPSS
- 0.0000
- Vendors
- Apache Software Foundation
- Products
-
Apache Wicket (10.0.0 ≤10.9.1)Apache Wicket (9.14.0 ≤9.24.0)
- Aliases
-
GHSA-w478-29fp-9q59
ENISA description: Allocation of resources without limits or throttling in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.upload.resource.AbstractFileUploadResource is the server side of the form-less upload offered by FileUploadToResourceField, which posts the selected files to a separately mounted resource rather than through a Form. The resource is an application-wide singleton with no component to consult, so newResourceResponse() takes the three limits that bound the upload - the total request size, the maximum size of a single part and the maximum number of parts - from the request parameters maxSize, fileMaxSize and fileCountMax, and hands them to the multipart parser as they arrive. Nothing binds those numbers to the field that is supposed to be uploading. A request naming a very large maxSize is therefore parsed with no effective ceiling on the total size, and omitting fileMaxSize and fileCountMax leaves the per-part and part-count limits unset as well. The values the application configured through FileUploadToResourceField#setMaxSize(), #setFileMaxSize() and #setFileCountMax() are consulted only when the client omits the corresponding parameter, so against a client that supplies one they have no effect at all. Parts above the parser's in-memory threshold are spooled to the container's temporary directory, and the file parts are then copied into the folder the application's IUploadsFileManager owns, under a sub-folder the request names, where they remain. A part that is not a file is read into the heap in full while the request is parsed. One request, repeatable, can therefore consume as much disk or as much heap as the client chooses to send. The resource carries no authorization annotation and the default authorization strategy permits every resource request, so unless the application authorizes the resource itself the request needs no authentication, no session, no prior page view and no user interaction. An application is affected where it uses FileUploadToResourceField, or mounts FileUploadResourceReference itself. This is not the ordinary upload path: the resource is a singleton that has to be created and mounted deliberately. An application that configures no upload limit at all loses nothing, because Wicket applies no total-size limit of its own by default; what the defect removes is a limit the application set. Uploads through Form with FileUploadField, and through AjaxFileDropBehavior, are not affected, because both read their limits from the component rather than from the request. The upload resource does not exist in the 8.x line. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 9.14.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.9.1. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.
EUVD references (1)
Affected products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache Wicket |
9.14.0 (affected),
10.0.0 (affected)
|
— |
Vendor references (1)
References embedded in the original CVE record by the assigning CNA.
MITRE references (1) cveawg.mitre.org
Pulled from MITRE's CVE Services API by the 🛰 Backfill from MITRE button.
Web references (0)
DuckDuckGo results ranked by threat-intel / vendor advisory domains. Generated by the 🔎 Find references (web) button above — same flow as the Remediations search.
No web references attached yet.
NVD-tagged references (1)
Reference list NVD curates from the CNA record, vendor advisories, and third-party reports. The tag chips below are NVD's analyst-assigned categories.
- https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/bw3hn5cch3q7yrsl05m8mvmgyx4m98y7 security@apache.org
Remediations (10)
Remediations are stored against the linked Threat row; the list below is deduplicated across both pages.
-
web:blogs.oracle.com
For more information about the Critical Security Patch Update program, see the security vulnerability remediation practices page located on the Oracle Trust Center.
2026-11-02 11:27 UTC -
web:cvedatabase.com
Search and analyze CVE vulnerabilities with instant access to CVSS scores, affected products, and remediation guidance.
2026-11-02 11:27 UTC -
web:cvetodo.com
CVE-2026-84170 : Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in Apache Wicket. Includes technical details, affected versions, and mitigation steps.
2026-11-02 11:27 UTC -
web:cyberupdates365.com
Track critical CVE vulnerabilities 2026 with verified enterprise patch guides. Fix zero-days across VMware, WordPress, Windows, and cloud infrastructure.
2026-11-02 11:27 UTC -
web:www.aikido.dev
None of these is a clean fix , which is why the decision on how to remediate depends on knowing what package versions are running in production and why. This post will cover how AI has accelerated CVE detection and discovery, the upgrade trap, what CVE remediation actually involves in 2026 , and how to solve the CVE remediation problem.
2026-11-02 11:27 UTC -
web:www.bleepingcomputer.com
CISA has ordered federal agencies to secure their systems by Saturday against ongoing attacks exploiting a critical vulnerability in the Oracle E-Business Suite financial application.
2026-11-02 11:27 UTC -
web:www.cisa.gov
For the benefit of the cybersecurity community and network defenders—and to help every organization better manage vulnerabilities and keep pace with threat activity—CISA maintains the authoritative source of vulnerabilities that have been exploited in the wild. Organizations should use the KEV catalog as an input to their vulnerability management prioritization framework. Learn more about ...
2026-11-02 11:27 UTC -
web:www.openhands.dev
Compare 8 automated vulnerability remediation tools for 2026 on fixes, prioritization, integrations, and deployment control.
2026-11-02 11:27 UTC -
web:www.oracle.com
Additional CVEs addressed are: The patch for CVE - 2026 -34481 also addresses CVE - 2026 -34477, CVE - 2026 -34478, CVE - 2026 -34479, and CVE - 2026 -34480. Oracle Fusion Middleware Risk Matrix This Critical Security Patch Update contains 106 new security patches for Oracle Fusion Middleware. 53 of these vulnerabilities may be remotely exploitable without authentication, i.e., may be exploited over a ...
2026-11-02 11:27 UTC -
web:www.oracle.com
Prior Critical Patch Update and Critical Security Patch Update advisories should be reviewed for information regarding earlier published security patches. Refer to Critical Patch Updates, Critical Security Patch Updates, Security Alerts and Bulletins for information about Oracle Security advisories.
2026-11-02 11:27 UTC
AI Forensic Analysis
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Raw JSON
The full cvelistV5 record. Download as CVE-2026-84170.json.
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